New World Order: Unity Doctrine of The North American Union (UNITY SERIES Book 1)

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While the Security Council is the principal institutional component of this security regime, it is not the only U. General Assembly is empowered to adopt recommendations that relate to matters of peace and security, including questions of disarmament and arms control. Moreover, the International Court of Justice has been involved in matters of international peace and security through the exercise of both its contentious and advisory judicial functions. This will become apparent by examining the content and negotiating history of the provisions of the U.

Charter that relate to the powers, prerogatives, and structure of the Security Council.

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Before doing so, however, it is necessary to outline the characteristics of a Great Power Concert and to highlight how this type of security regime differs from a collective security mechanism. It was a security regime that provided a mechanism for the leading European powers of the nineteenth century to consult on political matters and to jointly manage the affairs of the continent. As I discuss further below, the Concert of Europe and the United Nations emerged from similar political circumstances.

Both of these bodies began as a grand military alliance in the midst of a major armed conflict and then evolved into a political apparatus to manage the post-war order. This treaty is widely understood to have been the precursor of the Concert of Europe. After Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo and dispatched to St. Helena, the allied powers concluded the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance on November 20, , which created the Concert of Europe.

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The concert was not a twentieth-century style international organization. Rather, it operated through ad hoc meetings, which were called Congresses, at which the four Great Powers—Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia—deliberated on a whole range of crises and situations that threatened to undermine the European order or to upset the balance of power between these states.

To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present treaty, and to consolidate the connections which at the present moment so closely unite the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their meetings at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the Sovereigns themselves or by their respective Ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

Putting aside the pompous poeticism of nineteenth-century diplomatic language, the outstanding feature of this provision is that, unlike Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty quoted above, the Great Powers promised nothing in the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance except that they shall meet regularly to consult on matters of common interest and to consider the measures deemed necessary to maintain peace and stability in Europe.

Nowhere did these Great Powers promise to preserve the peace, nor did these powers commit to defend each other or any other state against aggression, nor did they guarantee to enforce international law or to uphold the political understandings or legal agreements reached at the Congresses that these powers held. The Great Powers retained the authority to determine which situations were serious enough to warrant convening a Congress, and in exercising that authority, the decision to convene a Congress almost always depended on whether a situation affected the security, interests, or rights of a Great Power.

These Great Powers also retained the discretion to determine what measures should be implemented to address these situations. Indeed, the Great Powers did not commit to consult or confer with the less influential European states. The Concert of Europe, in other words, was not democratic.

The right of these Great Powers to determine the fate of Europe was based on nothing but the fact of their superior material power.

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The twists and turns of the others could never have this effect. Harry Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace Despite the absence of any guarantee of collective action to preserve the peace or prevent aggression, the Concert of Europe contributed to continental peace by helping to avert Great Power war, at least until the Crimean War of Critical to the success of the Concert of Europe, especially during the early years of its operation, was the common strategic outlook shared by the leading European powers of that era.

These states generally agreed on the principal sources of threats to order and stability in Europe and committed to consult and act in concert to confront these threats. Moreover, for the conservative monarchies of Europe, especially Austria and Russia, cooperation was necessary to defend against the danger of domestic instability caused by reformists and radical revolutionaries alike.

Once the strategic outlook of the Great Powers diverged, however, the Concert of Europe became less effectual. The principal source of discord between the erstwhile allies related to the question of intervention in the internal affairs of states to prevent social upheavals that could threaten monarchical rule. Austria and Russia sought to use the concert to authorize and justify intervention to quell popular uprisings against European monarchies.

Britain, on the other hand, viewed the concert as a mechanism to mobilize against any power seeking to achieve continental dominance by force. If implemented, this proposal would have upgraded the Concert of Europe into a collective security mechanism dedicated to preserving the territorial integrity of European states and protecting their governments against regime change.

There is no doubt that a breach of the covenant by any one state is an injury which all other states may, if they shall think fit, either separately or collectively resent, but the treaties do not impose, by express stipulation, the doing so as matter of positive obligation.

Till, then, a system of administering Europe by a general alliance of all its States can be reduced to some practical form, all notions of general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned, and States must be left to rely for their security upon the justice and wisdom of their respective systems. In effect, what the British Government was saying is that, first, the Quadruple Alliance did not entail any guarantee of mutual assistance and did not generate any legal obligation on its members to aid their partners or protect them against an attack on their governments, possessions, or territories.

Second, Britain argued that in the event of a breach of international law, each member of the Great Powers retains discretion to determine whether the situation necessitates a collective response. As the next section demonstrates, the U. It might be said that collective security is a protean concept that admits various forms of security regimes, including security regimes and arrangements that operate on the bases of rules and assumptions that are less exacting than those I outlined in this Section.

Accordingly, it could be argued that I have constructed an artificial threshold that is too high for the Security Council to realistically meet. In short, I would be accused of creating a vulnerable strawman.

I disagree with such criticism. As Richard Betts explains, defining collective security less restrictively: [b]y making it less collective and less automatic [makes it] hard to differentiate from the traditional balance of power standards it is supposed to replace.

Charles Fourier

Unless collective security does mean something significantly different from traditional forms of combination by states against common enemies, in alliances based on specific interests, the term confuses the actual choices. The composition, structure, and powers of the Security Council bear a striking resemblance to the Concert of Europe. Both of these bodies created a Great Power directorate to oversee and manage the European state-system, in the case of the Concert of Europe, and the international system, in the case of the Security Council.

Moreover, neither of these bodies provided its members any guarantee of protection against aggression or any promise to enforce international law. And finally, the Great Powers that led both of these bodies retained limitless discretion regarding whether and how to respond to breaches of international law and whether and how to intervene in crises that threatened peace and security.

These rules are codified in the U. Charter, which also outlines the mandates of the institutions that constitute this security regime. Before describing the content of these rules and the powers of these institutions, however, it is necessary to identify the policy purposes underlying these rules and institutions.

This is because rules and institutions are not natural phenomena. They are human creations that are designed to serve the political, economic, and social interests of their creators. Indeed, the content of all rules and the structure of the institutions entrusted with the application of these rules are determined by these interests. Accordingly, to understand why the U. Just as Austria, Britain, Russia, and Prussia created the post-Napoleonic European order at the Congress of Vienna, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain convened a series of summit conferences and meetings during which the parameters of the post-World War II world order the structure of the United Nations were determined.

The most significant of these summits and meetings were the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the Yalta Conference. North Carolina Press ; S. Charter was drafted and adopted. This, in their view, required providing a mechanism that would help maintain peace between the Great Powers, which were the only states capable of threatening world order due to their global political influence and unparalleled military capabilities. It was also assumed that, by virtue of their superior capabilities, the responsibility of managing the international system and confronting threats to world order would fall to those Great Powers.

As this process evolved, the United States succeeded in involving China in the creation of the United Nations. It was those four powers that were imagined as the Four Policemen. Later, after its liberation from Nazi occupation, France was included in the creation of the United Nations and given a permanent seat on the U. Security Council.

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If those powers worked together effectively in responding to international crises, the United Nations would succeed and peace would prevail. It was hoped that the United Nations would provide a forum that would enable those Great Powers to remain united, to coordinate their policies, and to co-manage the international system. One important factor that influenced the United States, Soviet, and British leaders who deliberated on and determined the structure and functions of the United Nations was the lessons learned from the failure of the League of Nations.

Therefore, it was agreed that the success of the United Nations and the future of world order depended on ensuring that the Great Powers joined, remained in, and participated in the operations of the United Nations. To incentivize them to join the United Nations, the Great Powers needed assurances that their security and vital interests would not be jeopardized by the new organization. Otherwise, these powers might decline to join the organization and might adopt a hostile attitude towards it.

These were the basic policy purposes and assumptions that guided the creation the U. It was understood that the U. Second, it was agreed that this institution would be empowered with vast enforcement powers, including the ability to authorize the use of force in response to threats to the peace. Third, it was decided that the Great Powers would enjoy special privileges within that institution. These privileges were given in light of the special responsibilities of these leading states in the international system and as an assurance against the possibility that the United Nations would threaten the security or vital interests of these Great Powers.

Obviously, to discuss every attribute of the U. Indeed, there are numerous issues that I will not deal with here that deserve an extended discussion and that have been the subject of a large body of scholarship.

My view on this matter, which I will be unable to explain at length here, is that the Security Council itself is not bound by international law because, I believe, the Security Council as an entity does not enjoy international legal personality that enables it to bear either rights or duties under international law nor does it have the capacity to make claims under international law. On the other hand, the United Nations as an entity and the Member States of the Security Council obviously have international legal personality and are bound to operate within the bounds of international law.

Another matter that I will not be able to discuss here is the relationship between the Security Council and the other U. Rather, I will focus here on those characteristics of the Security Council that demonstrate the main claim of this Essay—namely, that the Council was intended to operate, not as a collective security mechanism, but as a Great Power concert, the principal purpose of which is to prevent Great Power war and to facilitate peaceful relations between the Great Powers. As discussed above, the principal feature of a collective security mechanism is that it provides its members with a guarantee of protection against aggression.

Nowhere, however, does the U. Charter extend to the U. Member States such a guarantee. In other words, conspicuously absent from the Charter is any language akin to that of Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty pursuant to which the NATO members pledge to consider that an attack against one is an attack against all.

Although the substantive rules enshrined in the Charter lack the elements of collective security, the vast powers and prerogatives of the Security Council might lead some to assume that it was intended to operate as a collective security mechanism.